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Comments to the Draft 5 Year Review Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, 
San Francisco, California, June 2018 
September 7, 2018 
INTRODUCTION 
The Environmental Law and Justice Clinic ofthe Golden Gate University School 
of Law subm its these comments to NA VF AC's Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation 
Work Plan, Former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, Cal(fornia, June 2018 
("Draft Review") , on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmenta l Justice 
("Greenaction") and its members and constituents in Bayview Hunters Point, San 
Francisco and in other communities located along San Francisco Bay. 
Greenaction is a multiracial grassroots organization founded and led by grassroots 
leaders from low-income and working class urban, rural , and indigenous communiti es. 
Our mission to fight environmental racism and injustice and build a clean, healthy and just 
future for all. Greenaction has been involved in health and environmental justice advocacy 
in Bayview Hunters Point since it was founded in 1997. This low-income commun ity of 
color continues to be negatively and dispropot1ionately impacted by pollution, 
gentr ifi cation, health disparities, and other forms of environmental , social and economic 
injustice. 
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Bayview Hunters Point residents have borne the brunt of the impacts ofthe toxic 
and radioactive waste at the Hunters Pont Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"). As such, they have a 
direct, personal and long-standing interest in assuring the maximal cleanup of the 
Superfund site. 
A. The Community Doubts the Navy's Commitment To Rebuilding 
Trust 
"The fraud and uncertainty surrounding Tt EC's work at HPNS has caused a 
complete loss of trust in the Navy by the local community.'' 1 This is not a member of 
Greenaction speaking. This is the Navy's Laura Duchnak, BRAC PMO's Director. She's 
right. 
Unfortunately, though the Navy acknowledges it has lost all credibility, it remains 
adamant that it will do nothing to address or correct it. It continues to downplay the fraud 
and its effects on the cleanup. It promises one thing but delivers another. It has not taken 
the evidence of previous contamination in Parcel A at all seriously. 
If the Navy truly wants to start to repair relations with the community, it must take 
actions that demonstrate in concrete terms how it will change its approach. This is not just 
another cleanup; it's a cleanup tainted by massive fraud. 
As Ms. Duchnak's letter said, the fraud "had far-reaching consequences for the 
United States, its employees, the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the 
taxpayers." The Navy should act like it. The loss of trust extends to the hazardous waste 
cleanup as well. 
The revisions of the Draft Parcel G Work Plan and this Drqft Review are likely to be 
the first two tests of the Navy's willingness to change course. Will it live up to the 
promises it made to the community to resample all Tetra Tech's work? Will it incorporate 
1 Victim Impact Statement in the Matter ofUSv. Hubbard, Mach 15,2018, attached as Appendix IV. 
2 
the community's concerns into its final work plan and five-year review? Or will it betray 
the community's trust yet again? 
B. The Draft Review Does Not Comply with Navy Policy 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA § 12l(c) sets forth the requirement for a five-year review: 
If the President selects a remedial action that results in any hazardous 
substances, pollutants, or contaminants remaining at the site, the President 
shall review such remedial action no less often than each five years after the 
initiation of such remedial action to assure that human health and the 
environment are being protected by the remedial action being implemented. 
In addition, if upon such review it is the judgment of the President that action 
is appropriate at such site in accordance with section [104] or [106], the 
President shall take or require such action. The President shall report to the 
Congress a list of facilities for which such review is required, the results of 
all such reviews, and any actions taken as a result of such reviews. 
Similarly, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations §300.430(f)(4)(ii)] states: 
If a remedial action is selected that results in hazardous substances, 
pollutants, or contaminants remaining at the site above levels that allow for 
unlimited use and unrestricted exposure, the lead agency shall review such 
action no less often than every five years after the initiation of the selected 
remedial action. 
To implement five-year reviews at properties owned by the Navy, it 
promulgated a policy, Department o.fNavy Policyfor CERCLA Five-Year Reviews. 
This Fourth Five-Year Review states its objective: "The purpose ofthe fourth 
five-year review is to provide an update on the status of remedial actions (RAs) and 
post-RA activities implemented since the third five-year review, evaluate whether 
these RAs and post-RA activities are protective of human health and the environment, 
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and assess the progress toward meeting the recommendations made in the third five-
year review."2 
Unfortunately the Draft Review neither complies with the Department of Navy 
Policy for CERCLA Five-Year Reviews nor the intention stated above. For example, 
paragraph 9a ofthe policy states, "The Five Year Report should; 1) clearly state whether 
the remedy is or is expected to be protective, 2) document any deficiencies identified 
during the review, and 3) recommend specific actions to ensure that a remedy will be or 
will continue to be protective.'' (Emphasis added, p. 4). 
As further detailed below, the Draft Review fails in its most basic function-
identifying whether the remedies are protective. Rather, it equivocates. The Draft Review 
must clearly state that the radiological remedies are NOT currently protective. And if the 
Navy states that the remedies "will be" protective, it should detail what "specific actions" 
will be taken, parcel by parcel, to assure that will be the case, as required by Navy policy. 
Furthermore, the policy's paragraph 9b states, "Where necessary, five year review 
reports should contain descriptions of follow up actions needed to achieve, or to continue 
to ensure protectiveness. Along with these recommendations, the report should list a 
timetable for performing the actions ... " 
The Draft Review fails to contain descriptions of the specific actions the Navy will 
take to achieve protectiveness. All it says is that the Navy intends to kick that can down 
the road until2023. There is no explanation why what the Navy knows now is excluded; it 
must be included. 
The Navy must revise the Draft Review to comply with CERCLA's plain language 
and to comply with its own policies. 
2 Draft 5 Year Review Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California, June 2018, p. 1-1. 
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II. RADIOLOGICAL- General Comments 
A. Facts- The Navy Must Tell the Whole Truth 
The Draft Review is similar to the Drc([t Parcel G Work Plan before it in the way 
it: mischaracterizes the facts; minimizes the effects of Tetra Tech's radiological fraud and 
its impact on the remediation; and abandons its public promises. 
Emblematic ofthe Navy's recasting of facts are these remarkable assertions: 
The Navy has completed an extensive review of the radiological remediation 
documents and data as part of its evaluation of the potential contractor manipulation 
and/or falsification of data_ and has identified the areas where resurveying for 
radionuclides is required to address all issues discovered during the Navy's 
evaluation. Any available information on the status of the review and discoveries 
made by the Nayy were considered during the development of this five-year review. 
(p. 5-3.) 
The Navy pretends it proactively has done everything it can to investigate and redress 
the fraud, when nothing could be further from the truth. The Navy makes it plain in this 
review that it still does not believe comprehensive sampling is necessary. Crucially, the Navy 
actions were limited to a document review- Tetra Tech's discredited documents, no less.3 
Only when one parses the paragraph can one see the Navy's true intentions. 
Start with the phrase, "potential contractor manipulation and/or falsification of 
data." Despite numerous sworn whistleblower affidavits attesting to widespread fraud, 
despite the Navy's own data review revealing evidence of fraud in approximately 40% of 
samples in Parcels Band G, despite the EPA finding that the Navy's data review missed 
about half the data problems,4 and despite two criminal convictions of Tetra Tech 
supervisors- the very supervisors identified as culpable in the whistleblowers' testimony 
-the Navy still insists the fraud was "'potential.'' 
3 The Navy has provided only two of the 117 Tetra Tech documents listed in the Draft Review's 
"References." See Section IIC below. 
4 The contractor(s) that missed half the data problems have demonstrated their undependability. The 
Navy should commit to obtaining different contractors that the Navy, the community and the regulators 
can have confidence in. 
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The Navy claims it "has identified the areas where resurveying for radionuclides is 
required to address all issues discovered during the Navy's evaluation.'' That is simply 
false, unless by "all areas'' the Navy means all of Parcels A, B, C, D, E, G, UC-1, UC-2 
and UC-3. If the Navy truly has identified answers to all issues arising from the Tetra 
Tech Fraud, why are they not included in the Draft Review? The Navy should identify" 
the areas where resurveying for radionuclides is required" on maps of each parcel. (Also see 
section III (I) below regarding Figure 3-13.) 
So far the Navy has proposed resurveying only in one Parcel, Parcel G. The Draft 
Work Plan for that project was so roundly criticized by comments made to it by EPA that 
it was unresponsive to its concerns that it threatens to invoke the dispute-resolution 
clauses ofthe Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) if the Navy continues to ignore them: 
''Without the requested changes, the approach will not provide the necessary confidence 
level to establish when Parcel G would be suitable for redevelopment, and EPA may 
invoke the dispute resolution process described in the FF A." 
Then the Navy claims "any available information" was considered, but only "any 
available information" from the data review, that is, any available Tetra Tech data. 
Pointedly, the Navy cannot claim that it considered "any available information" without 
that tremendously narrowing qualification. 
Among the "available information'' the Navy ignores are: all of the 
whistleblowers' sworn statements filed in support ofGreenaction's state and federal 
petitions to revoke Tetra Tech's licenses;5 eyewitness and documentary evidence, 
including sampling documents and test results demonstrating there were elevated levels 
ofradionuclides in Parcel A's sanitary and storm water sewer systems that should have 
been investigated but never were;6 lists of approximately 50 additional witnesses who the 
Navy should interview;7 and BRAC's own victim impact statement in the criminal cases 
5 The federal petition and its supporting documents are incorporated herein and are available at: 
https://www .dropbox.com/sh/1 gfn7ja0fc3c516/ AAD7-9qzmbhhUTkGvpN4p Xua?dl=O. The state 
petition and its supporting documents are incorporated herein and are available at: 
https://www .dropbox.com/sh/zh2pknpgvuucjp0/ AAA-1 xjC HxjVtO s8wvTpm9Za?dl=O. 
6 See Appendix VI, Rad Survey Results. 
7 See Appendix VII, emails from ELJC to the Navy. 
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against Tetra Tech's former supervisor Justin Hubbard. In a March 15, 2018 letter, Laura 
Duchnak, the Director of BRAC PMO, wrote of the impact of Tetra Tech's fraud: 
The redevelopment of HPNS was supposed to revitalize the community and provide 
jobs and 
affordable housing; all of that is now on hold indefinitely as the Navy and the 
regulatory 
agencies have determined that TtEC's work is unreliable. 
The total cost for the database evaluation, work plan preparation, and preliminary 
field work is approximately $8.8M .... The EPA has indicated that it would require 
all work to be reperformed as originally contracted. However, these discussions are 
not final. The Navy's best estimates for required re-work costs currently range from 
$1OOM to $300M. 
In sum, the Navy has expended $272.8 M to date paying TtEC for their work at 
HPNS, identifying the fraud, and taking measures to prevent further fraud. 
Depending on the cost of required re-work, this number will certainly rise to $372.8 
M and is likely to rise as high as $572.8 M. This amount of money would buy a new 
Littoral Combat ship. It is nearly half of the Navy's total expenditures for all 
environmental clean-up activities at HPNS through fiscal year 2017 ($991.1 M). 
Mr. Hubbard's actions had far-reaching consequences for the United States, its 
employees, 
the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the taxpayers. 8 
Ms. Duchnak does not discuss "potential" fraud. It is actual and extensive. The 
more the Navy soft-pedals the fraud, the Jess credibility it has. lfthe fraud is real enough 
to have had the effect Ms. Duchnak describes, it is well past time for the Navy to drop 
references to "potential" fraud. 
8 See Appendix IV. 
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Finally, the Navy claims credit for "discoveries made by the Navy." The Navy did 
make one important discovery, it's true. Its employee flagged the low Potassium-40 (K-
40) data that first raised the issue of fraud. But after that, the Navy closed its "eyes" and 
"ears." It made no further "discoveries." Rather, it ignored them. 
In June 2016, for example, Anthony Smith, one of the whistleblowers, took the 
Navy and regulators on a tour of the shipyard during which he detailed some of the 
fraudulent activities he participated in. The Navy has never, to this day, spoken to him to 
follow up. 
More than a year before this Draft Review was released, on June 29, 2017, 
Greenaction filed its NRC Petition seeking to revoke Tetra Tech's federal license, 
supported by affidavits signed under penalty of perjury by numerous former radiation 
workers at HPNS who have come forth to blow the whistle on Tetra Tech's fraud and the 
Navy's complicity in it. They detailed six types offraud: {1) fake sampling, in which soil 
samples were repotied to have been taken at one location when they were actually taken 
from another; (2) samples and their analytical results were discarded because they came 
back too "hot;" (3) scanning data were altered to make them appear acceptable; 
(4) building survey data were fabricated; (5) radioactive material in soil was inadequately 
remediated, resulting in potentially contaminated soil being used as backfill for trenches at 
the Shipyard; and (6) Portal Monitor procedures were altered resulting in potentially 
radioactively-contaminated soil being allowed to be shipped oftsite to points unknown.9 
Greenaction obtained sworn affidavits from Archie Jackson, Bert Bowers, Susan 
Andrews, Arthur Jahr, Richard Stoney and Robert McLean, each of whom documented 
improper activities. Their statements are readily available, as they are exhibits in support 
of its June 2017 NRC Petition. Greenaction has repeatedly urged the Navy to interview 
them. The Navy has never, to this day, done so. Sadly, Mr. Jahr has since passed away; 
any untapped knowledge he may have had is now gone forever. 
9 See NRC Petition, p. I. 
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Greenaction also provided the Navy with two lists of additional witnesses, totaling 
approximately 50 people. The Navy ignored them. To the best of our knowledge, none of 
these witnesses have ever been contacted, despite more than a year's urging that the Navy 
interview them. 
Instead of doing what was called for- investigating the full extent of the fraud's 
impact on the cleanup -the Navy allowed Tetra Tech to investigate itselj; and accepted its 
self-serving and false claims the fraud was minimal and closed its eyes and ears to the 
whistleblowers. 
Rather than conduct a meaningful investigation, the Navy spent months and $8.8 
million, according to Ms. Duchnak, on a "data review," whose purpose was not to find if 
more fraud took place, but rather to statistically validate Tetra Tech's bogus data. 
However, in results that were hugely surprising to the Navy but to no one else who has 
followed the disastrous radiation remediation, the data review not only supported the 
whistleblowers' testimony, it found much more evidence of potential fraud than even the 
whistleblowers said- approximately 40%! 
Even these remarkable findings underplayed the full extent ofthe evidence of 
fraud. The EPA's review of precisely the same data found more than double the data 
problems the Navy did. EPA's review of data from Parcel G trench units, for example, 
found a whopping 97% of the data were questionable- virtually all of it. 
In addition, two Tetra Tech supervisors have pled guilty to federal charges arising 
from their role in the fraud and are currently serving eight-month sentences. More charges 
may be forthcoming. 
Despite the plethora of proof, however, the Navy continues to treat the proven 
facts as mere allegations. Two years ago they were allegations. In the ensuing time those 
allegations have been proven. 
Forced to confront irrefutable proof dashing the Navy's hope that Tetra Tech's 
data was salvageable, in December 2017 it finally announced the inevitable conclusion it 
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had been seeking to avoid all along; all ofTetra Tech's data has to be thrown out. The 
Navy's point man on the project, Derek Robinson, promised multiple times publicly that 
all Tetra Tech's work would be redone, starting with resampling all locations where the 
fraudulent firm worked. 
EPA heard the same promises Greenaction members did. Here's how Lily Lee, the 
EPA's HPNS Site Manager described what the Navy said in her interview for the Draft 
Review: "The Navy, as the lead on cleanup, has responded through a comprehensive 
radiological data evaluation, increased oversight of ongoing radiological work, 
development of plans to res ample all radiological survey units on site that involved Tetra 
Tech EC Inc., and increased community involvement outreach." (Italics in original, 
underline added.) Similarly, as Angeles Herrera, the Assistant Director ofEPA's 
Superfund Division, Federal Facility and Site Cleanup Branch, wrote in his August 14, 
2018 transmittal letter ofthe EPA's comments to the Draft Parcel G Work Plan, "The 
Navy has agreed to retest all of the survey units where Tetra Tech EC Inc. did previous 
radiological work." (Emphasis added.) 
"Resample all survey units" was what the Navy promised. 
As we pointed out in our comments to the Draft Parcel G Work Plan, the Navy 
has once again demonstrated that its promises are false. Rather than live up to its 
promises, the Navy's draft plan only intends to resample a small percentage of survey 
units. It must not be allowed to get away with reneging on its promises when it comes to 
either the Parcel G Work Plan or this Draft Review: it must commit to resampling all 
Tetra Tech's work. 
This Draft Review, however, fails to even acknowledge the Draft Parcel G Work 
Plan exists, let alone disclose the extremely limited sampling and scanning it 
contemplates. 
This Draft Review was published more than six months after the Navy finally 
abandoned its efforts to salvage Tetra Tech's data through its data review. Yet there is 
scant mention of the sequence of events leading to the status that is supposed to be 
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reported in a Five-Year Review. No mention that the fraud was discovered in 2012. No 
mention that Tetra Tech admitted to fraud in 2014. No mention that whistleblowers came 
forward in 2016. No mention of their testimony proving widespread fraud. No mention 
that the Navy believed a fraudulent firm more than whistleblowers' statements under oath. 
No mention ofthe disastrous (to the Navy) results of the data review. No mention of 
EPA's finding that the Navy's data review missed halfthe data problems. No mention that 
the Navy has admitted all Tetra Tech's data is being thrown out. No mention ofthe 
Navy's public promises to finally own up to the fraud and do what should have been clear 
from the beginning; start over. No mention that the Navy's Draft Parcel G Work Plan 
reneges on the Navy's multiple promises to retest all Tetra Tech's work and only test one-
third of the trench units and one-half ofthe buildings. 
Here is the bureaucratese the Navy employs instead, using Parcel 8-1 as an 
example: "The remedies completed to date for Parcel 8-1 are protective of human health 
and the environment, noting that the radiological removal actions are being retested." 
Identical language is used in Section 8, Protectiveness Statement, for Parcels 8-2 C, D-2, 
E, G, UC- I, UC-2 and UC-3. 
These statements are false. Given that the Navy has publicly and repeatedly stated 
it will no longer rely on any Tetra Tech data, there is no factual basis for claiming the 
radiological remedies "completed" by Tetra Tech are "protective of human health and the 
environment." This can only be true if the Navy relies on Tetra Tech's discredited data-
data even the Navy now agrees, however reluctantly, is useless. As we return to in our 
comments on Protectiveness Statements (see section II G below), the only accurate answer 
to the question of protectiveness is "no". There are no data demonstrating protectiveness 
whatsoever. Unless and until all ofTetra Tech's work is properly and comprehensively 
resampled and, where necessary, re-remediated, the Navy cannot claim radiological 
protectiveness. 
The phrase, "noting that the radiological removal actions are being retested," does 
not substitute for the Navy's duty to be factually accurate in its Statement of 
Protectiveness. "Noting" that all of Tetra Tech's work must be redone is like saying that 
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the Navy's oversight was exemplary, "noting that the Navy squandered more than $200 
million and more than a decade." 
The Navy must not be allowed to mislead the public and regulators by dismissing 
the fraud's impact on the cleanup anymore. 
B. ParceiA 
The Drqft Review completely excludes Parcel A: "Parcel A is not discussed in this 
report because the parcel required no action under CERCLA." (p.l-2).The reason Parcel A 
"required no action under CERCLA" is because the Navy did an incompetent job 
investigating the possibility of radiological contamination there. 
Earlier this year, Greenaction brought forth both eyewitness and documentary 
evidence- including sample results- proving the original Parcel A storm water and 
sanitary sewer systems contained elevated levels of radionuclides that should have been 
investigated but never were. Greenaction has requested that the Navy and regulators report 
all information they have concerning what happened to the Parcel A sewers and their 
associated soils. The sewer pipes may have been disposed of illegally; it is so far unknown 
whether contaminated pipes were disposed of at facilities not licensed for radioactive 
waste. Greenaction has developed information indicating the soils from the Parcel A 
sewer systems were essentially "pushed over" the hill atop Parcel A into neighboring 
locations as part of grading Parcel A prior to development. We have asked both EPA and 
the Navy to investigate. So far as we know, both have flatly refused. 
A description of an investigation of Parcel A's sewer systems and associated soils 
must be added into the Draft Review. 
C. Reliance on Tetra Tech Data 
The Navy improperly continues to rely on Tetra Tech data for the Five-Year 
Review despite already agreeing to discard it. The Index of the review lists 117 Tetra 
Tech, EC Inc. documents, 91 of which are entitled either "Final" or "Final Final" status 
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surveys, none of which have been made available to the public. Greenaction has requested 
these documents in writing but the Navy refuses to provide them. Accordingly, 
Greenaction has requested them through a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request. 
There are no rational reasons the Navy should rely on or cite any ofTetra Tech's 
discredited data for any purpose. The Draft Review should be scrubbed of all Tetra Tech 
radiological data; all Tetra Tech documents listed in the References should be excised. 
D. Investigating Soil That Was Improperly Allowed to Leave HPNS 
Greenaction has provided credible evidence to the Navy that soil, improperly 
scanned at Radiological Screening Yard ("RSY") pads or the Portal Monitor, or both, 
resulted in a significant amount of potentially radiologically contaminated soil being 
permitted to exit Hunters Point Naval Shipyard improperly. Some ofthe soil was 
allegedly disposed of at landfills not licensed for low-level radioactive waste around the 
San Francisco Bay Area. (See NRC Petition, pp. 22-25.) 
It is incumbent on the Navy to track down that soil and take appropriate actions to 
insure that unwitting people are not exposed to radioactive contamination that originated 
at HPNS. The Drafi Review should include a statement that the Navy will investigate and 
will publish a plan to do so that will be open to public comment. 
III. RADIOLOGICAL COMMENTS - Specific 
A. Section 1- Introduction 
The Introduction kicks off the litany of half-truths that litter the Navy's Draft 
Revie-...v. It claims it, "identities issues found during this fourth tive-year review and 
recommendations to address them." 
In addition to the issues already mention in section lA above, the Draft Review 
elides the Navy's own lack of oversight in permitting the fraud to take place under its nose 
for years, and the regulatory agencies' failures of oversight as well. The Navy should own 
up to the ugly truth, not attempt to bury it. 
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B. Section 2 -Site Background 
Section 2.5.2 of the Draji Review, Future Land Uses, fails to acknowledge that 
during the five-year review period the proposed use of Parcel G was changed from almost 
no residential use to the entire parcel being open to residential use. Nowhere in the Draft 
Review is there are discussion of how this changed use will impact the remediation. 10 
C. Section 3 -Response Action Summary 
The introduction to Section 3 states that Section 3, among other things, "describes 
the implementation status of the selected remedy for each parcel." (p. 3-1 ). But this is 
manifestly untrue when it comes to the radiological remedies. 
The Draji Review provides virtually no information about the status of there-
investigation of Tetra Tech's work. Although the Navy released a Drqft Parcel G Work 
Plan in June 2018, a month before the release of the Draft Review, there is not a single 
mention of it. 
The information about the other parcels is just as scant. Although the Navy 
announced publicly at the end of2017 that all of Tetra Tech's work would be redone, the 
Draft Review says absolutely nothing about when draft work plans for the other parcels 
will be released; what the resampling strategies will be; a timeline for all such actions; or 
anything else. 
The only thing the Drqft Review says is that "All radiological work is currently 
being reviewed to determine if current site conditions are compliant with the RAOs." 
(Section 3.3 .2.1, p. 3-12, for parcel B, for example). What the "review" consists of is not 
addressed, as if the Navy has no idea what to do and as if it hasn't already decided exactly 
what to do. 
The Navy must acknowledge the truth; none of the sites Tetra Tech worked on are 
compliant with the RAOs. The Navy must also abide by what it has promised publicly in 
1° Feasibility Assessment for Evaluating Areas with Residential Land Use Restrictions, Parcel G, 
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California, Nov. 30,2016. 
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more than one forum: all Tetra Tech's data have to be thrown out and the Navy must start 
over. All areas Tetra Tech worked on have to be resampled and if necessary, re-
remediated, as the Navy has promised. 
While the Draft Review omits essential information, it includes irrelevant data as 
if it were "factual." For example, the Navy congratulates itself on all the work that has 
been done; in Parcel C, for example, the Navy touts all that was accomplished: 
"Radiological surveys and remediation have been performed for all radiologically 
impacted buildings (203, 205 and discharge tunnel, 211, 214, 224, 241, 253, 271, and 
272), storm drains, and sanitary sewers, except for Buildings 211 and 253. In total, 37,572 
cubic yards of soil was removed from 19,260 linear feet of sanitary sewer and storm drain 
lines; approximately 987 cubic yards of soil was disposed off site as LLR W (TtEC, 
20 16d)." (p. 3-18.) Similar summaries are included as to the other parcels as well. 
But all that work was done by Tetra Tech. None of the work they claim to have 
done can be relied on. It all has to be resampled. So why does the Navy list these actions 
as if they were accomplishments? They are not. Instead, the Navy's summaries of how 
much dirt was moved, how many buildings were scanned, etc., only serve to illustrate the 
enormous impact of the fraud on the cleanup. What the Navy fails to say is that each and 
every one ofthose "accomplishments'' are useless because Tetra Tech's data are useless. 
These so-called accomplishments should be removed from the Draft Review. They 
have no relevance to assuring protectiveness. 
D. Section 4 - Progress Since Last Review 
Failure to address the Tetra Tech fraud in this, the Draft Fourth Five-Year Review, 
continues its omission in the Third Five-Year Review ("Third Review"), completed in 
November 2013. The original suspicions about Tetra Tech were raised a year before, in 
2012. Yet nowhere in the Third Review is there the slightest hint that Tetra Tech's data 
might be fraudulent. None of the recommendations for any ofthe parcels in the Third 
Review include any mention of the discovery of the fraud or what the Navy did about it 
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between its discovery and the release of the Third Review. The Third Review included no 
recommendations at all concerning the fraud the Navy already knew about. 
In Parcel D-2, for example, the Third Five-Year Review omitted a protectiveness 
statement "because the parcel was deemed to require no further action following 
completion of radiological remediation." (4.5, p. 4-3). But all Tetra Tech's data should 
have been suspect in 2012, calling into question the "completion of radiological 
remediation.'' 
When it comes to the radiological fraud, the Navy played "hide the ball" in 2013 
and obviously intends no change now. The Navy must be required to tell the whole truth 
about the radiological disaster it allowed to happen. It must not be allowed to dodge the 
truth or its responsibility any longer. 
E. Section 5 - Five-Year Review Process 
Section 5.2, Document and Data Review, states, "As part of this tive-year review, 
documents and data related to remedy implementation were reviewed for each parcel. The 
reviews primarily focused on (1) documents and data that provide information on the 
technical and regulatory considerations that led to remedy selection and implementation, 
(2) documents that demonstrate remedy completion, and (3) documents and parcel-
specific data that demonstrate the remedies continue to be protective of human health and 
the environment." (p. 5-2.) 
This is a microcosm of all that is wrong with the Navy's approach to the post-
Tetra Tech period. The Navy admits it doesn't take a dispassionate, objective view. It 
focuses on "documents that demonstrate remedy completion." It should be focusing on all 
relevant documents and data, whether they demonstrate compliance or not, especially if 
not. 
And, when it comes to Tetra Tech's work, ''parcel-specific data that demonstrate 
the remedies continue to be protective" are non-existent. It's all unreliable. None can 
demonstrate protectiveness or anything else. 
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Furthermore, the Fourth Five Year Review fails to look forward. It must 
discuss the need to amend all the existing RODs as they relate to radiological 
contamination, and Parcels E and E-2 for chemical contaminants. The current five 
year review process is the appropriate place to discuss the need for ROD amendments 
to account for new circumstances. 
In fact, the Navy has done precisely that in the past. For example, it discussed 
the possibility of an amendment to the Parcel B ROD in the First Five Year Review: 
"The future RA process for Parcel 8 could include a technical memorandum in 
support of a ROD amendment, a proposed plan (with community involvement), a 
ROD amendment, RD, and RA, followed by closeout activities." The Parcel B ROD 
was eventually amended, in part because of the recommendation made in the first 
review: 
In 2007-2008, the Navy prepared two technical memoranda ... in support of 
amending the ROD as recommended by the First 5-year review. These memoranda 
provided the technical foundation for identification of revised remedial alternatives 
and preparation of a proposed plan and subsequent amended ROD for Parcel B. 
(Second Five Year Review at 3.5.8). 
The Drafi Review should provide recommendations for the steps to be taken in 
the coming five years, informed by which new information that was not considered 
when the RODs were approved. 
F. Section 6- Technical Assessment 
The Draft Review is internally inconsistent. For example, Section 6 states, 
"Published documents report the completion of radiological surveys and remediation in 
IR-07/18 and Parcels B-1, B-2, C, D-1, D-2, E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3." (p. 6-6.) 
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Section 6.1.6, Radiological Surveys and Remediation, asks, "Are the 
radiological surveys and remediation remedies implemented in IR-07118 and Parcels B-1, 
B-2, C, D-1, D-2. E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3functioning as intended by the decision 
documents? YES (for IR-07/18 and Parcel D-1); NO (for Parcels B-1, B-2, C, D-2, E, G, 
UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3).P. 6-6). 
Again, the Navy cannot claim that remediation has been "completed" but in the 
next breath admit, "Well, not really." Having determined under public pressure and the 
insistence of the EPA that all Tetra Tech data are unreliable, the Navy must drop any 
pretense that radiological work was "completed.'' The Draft Review should consistently 
say that none of Tetra Tech's work was "completed" and that the remedies it implemented 
are not protective. 
As stated above, The Navy downplays the fraud throughout, including in Section 
6. For example, it states, "In January 2018, the Navy determined that a significant portion 
of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was compromised by 
potential manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological remediation 
contractors. Compromised data were identified in reports associated with Parcels B-1, B-
2, C, D-2, E, G, UC-1, UC-2, and UC-3. Again, this is an understatement. "A significant 
portion'' of Tetra Tech's data was not compromised; all of it was. And characterizing the 
fraud as "potential'' is belied by the facts, including those provided by BRAC's boss. It is 
past time for the Navy to stop denying that the fraud actually took place. 
In Section 6.2.3, Changes in Risk Assessment Methods, the Navy claims it can 
substitute a 2014 EPA supplemental guidance in place of the risk assessment and, without 
proof, further claims equivalency: "Use of these updated default exposure parameters in 
place of the original values used in the risk assessments for each ofthe parcels primarily 
results in increasing the RBCs for the adult receptors. The increase is not significantly 
different from the values estimated in the original risk assessments. As such, EPA changes 
to default exposure parameters do not affect the protectiveness of the remedies." (p. 6-12.) 
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However, as the EPA made quite clear in its comments to the Drafi Parcel G 
Work Plan, this substitution is improper; it impermissibly changes the ROD: 
At this stage of the CERCLA process, the cleanup goals have already been 
legally established. A new Radiation Risk Assessment is ordinarily only 
performed as part of a Five-Year Review to evaluate whether or not the original 
RG's are still protective. EPA has separately recommended that the Navy 
conduct this review, and, if any ofthe RGs are found to be no longer protective 
using the most current risk calculators, propose amendments to the Parcel G 
ROD to ensure protectiveness. For the current work plan, however, the current 
RGs still govern the cleanup and if any material is found on Parcel G that 
exceeds the RGs established in the Parcel G ROD for the ROCs, excluding 
naturally occurring and anthropogenic background, the material should be 
removed and disposed of in accordance with the ROD and other applicable laws 
and regulations. (p.3.) 
On the other hand, Greenaction would welcome it if the Navy did formally what it 
is attempting to do by sleight of hand- reopen the ROD to include newer, more protective 
standards. We urge the Navy to accept EPA's suggestion that as part ofthe five-year 
review, it formally reassess the standards set in the nine-year-old ROD to make them more 
protective. 
G. Section 7- Issues Recommendations and Other Findings 
The Draft Review claims in Section 7 that, "It is anticipated that the radiological 
rework will span 5 years and be completed prior to the next tive-year review.'' (p. 7-2.) 
This is yet another example of the Navy's wishful thinking. Consider that: the Navy 
claims it can redo more than a decade's work by Tetra Tech in less than half that time; to 
date the Navy still has not obtained an approved work plan for even a single parcel that 
needs to be reworked, nine months after the Navy finally acknowledged it would be 
necessary; and the Navy includes no timeline whatsoever detailing what activities will 
take place or when. Finally, consider this statement from Ms. Duchnak's victim impact 
statement: "The Navy estimates that the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has 
set back the planned transfer of HPNS property to the City by an approximate decade.'' 
The Navy needs to stop stating hope as fact. It cannot claim in the Draft Review 
that the project will be delayed five years, when BRAC's boss says it will be double that. 
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It is this kind oftransparently false optimism that continues to taint the Navy's relations 
with the community. 
Section 7 also states that the "Navy has determined that a significant portion'' of 
Tetra Tech's data was compromised. (p. 7-2.) As mentioned before, this is, at best, an 
understatement. All of Tetra Tech's data are compromised. The Navy admitted that 
publicly more than nine months ago. The Drqft Review must say that clearly and without 
evasion. 
H. Section 8 - Protectiveness Statement 
The Drqft Review repeats the following uninformative statement it makes as to 
Parcel B-1: "The remedies completed to date for Parcel B-1 are protective of human 
health and the environment, noting that the radiological removal actions are being 
retested.'' (p. 8.1.) The identical language is used in reference to Parcels B-2, C, G, UC-1, 
UC-2 and UC-3. (pp. 8-1 through 8-4.) 
The Five-Year Review must be factual. It must start by admitting the radiological 
remedies in those parcels are not currently protective. This is the inevitable conclusion of 
the EPA's critique ofthe Navy's data review. And it must acknowledge that the 
"radiological removal actions" will be retested, not that they "are being retested." The 
Navy has not obtained regulatory approval for any retesting yet. And if the Navy refuses 
to accede to the EPA suggestions in its comments to the Drqji Parcel G Work Plan, any 
retesting may have to await completion of the FFA's mandated dispute resolution process, 
further delaying when the Navy can truthfully claim the parcels "are being retested." As 
stated above, the revised Drqft Review should describe the radiological work the Navy 
intends to do in response to the fraud in each parcel, along with a time line of activities. 
The protectiveness statements for Parcels 0-1 and 0-2 are equally dishonest. The 
Drqft Review says the remedy for 0-1 "is expected to be protective." (p. 8-3.) Of course, 
the Navy has "expected'' a lot that did not tum out to be true. It expected Tetra Tech to do 
a proper job. It expected that it had the capacity to adequately supervise Tetra Tech. It 
expected to obtain free clearance in multiple parcels by now. Regulators and the public 
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have no reason to believe that the Navy will meet its expectations- it has not so far and, if 
the Drqfi Parcel G Work Plan and the Drqfi Review are any indication, the Navy has 
learned nothing from the Tetra Tech fraud and will blithely continue as it has done so far. 
As to Parcel D-2, the Navy follows the template it used in Section 3; cite all the 
"work" it has done and then add the non sequitor, "Radiological surveys and removal 
actions completed in Parcel D-2 were potentially compromised, and corrective actions are 
required to determine if the RAOs have been achieved." It does not matter how many 
cubic yards of soil remediation were fraudulently "completed," though it is instructive of 
the impact of the Navy allowing the fraud to take place over so many years. 
I. Figures 
Figures 3 through 13 are inaccurate. Each purports to show an ''Overview of 
Remedy Components,'' for a specific parcel. Yet none includes radiological components; 
none ofthe figure's "legends" even reference radioactivity. 
The Navy knows where Tetra Tech (as well as other radiological contractors) 
worked and can include such information. For example, the sewer systems have been 
identified as major radiological remediation sites. The Navy can and should include 
anticipated radiological work either in these figures or create separate radiological 
overviews of remedy components. 
IV. NON-RADIOLOGICAL 
A. The Draft Review Must Evaluate Protectiveness Consistent with Up-to 
Date, Scientific Sea and Bay-Level Rise Projections 
The Draft Review surprisingly and unacceptably fails to consider essential new 
data that was not available when the remedies were selected. The most important 
missing data are the latest scientific projections of sea-level rise. Because of the 
intense toxicity of the hazardous and radioactive wastes (including residue from 
atomic bomb testing) that current remedies leave capped onsite, and the persistence of 
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that toxicity, the Navy courts long-term disaster if its Bay-level rise assumptions are 
wrong. The Draft Review must not only evaluate protectiveness in light of estimates of 
Bay-level rise in the coming decades, but its threat from Bay-level rise centuries into 
the future as well. If the Navy is wrong now and global warming causes the Bay to 
rise enough to overwhelm current remedies, the health of nearby residents, subsistence 
fishers, people recreating on the proposed "open space" and the hundreds of thousands 
of people living along the San Francisco Bay will all be at unacceptable risk. 
State of California governmental agencies have done extensive research, 
analysis and reporting on the latest projections for rising sea levels - yet the Draft 
Review appears to have ignored this important science. 
The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) 
is a planning and regulatory agency with regional authority over San Francisco Bay, 
the Bay's shoreline band, and the Suisun Marsh. BCDC was created in 1965 and is the 
nation's oldest coastal zone regulatory agency. Its mission is to protect and enhance 
San Francisco Bay and to encourage the Bay's responsible and productive use for this 
and future generations. BCDC leads the Bay Area's ongoing multi-agency regional 
effort to address the impacts of rising sea level on shoreline communities and assets. 
BCDC's Adapting to Rising Tides project (ART) 
(http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/) started in 2010 when BCDC and NOAA's 
Office for Coastal Management brought together local, regional, state and federal 
agencies and organizations as well as non-profit and private associations for a 
collaborative planning project along the Alameda County shoreline. The project 
worked to identify how anticipated current and future flooding associated with global 
warming will affect communities, infrastructure, ecosystems and the economy. 
Since then, the ART has continued to both lead and support multi-sector and 
cross-jurisdictional projects that build both local and regional capacity in the Bay Area 
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to plan for and implement adaptation. These efforts have enabled ART to test and 
refine adaptation planning methods (ART Approach) to integrate sustainability and 
transparent decision-making from start to finish, and foster robust collaborations that 
lead to action on adaptation. BCDC has conducted extensive scientific research. Its sea 
level rise projections and mapping are widely accepted as sound by government 
agencies. Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise Analysis and Mapping 
Project has the latest data that the Navy must use in development of revised remedies 
to continue to assure protectiveness into the future. 11 
The State of California Ocean Protection Council's (OPC) 2018 State of 
California Sea Level Rise Guidance is also vitally important to consider in developing 
safe remedies. 12 
The 2018 update of the Guidance was created by the OPC, California Natural 
Resources Agency, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, and the California 
Energy Commission. The Guidance provides the best available data on sea level rise 
projections for California which should be used by state agencies and local 
governments in their planning, permitting, and investment decisions. 
The Remediation Design for Parcel E-2 is deficient given updated sea level 
rise projections. In Section 6.3 (Technical Assessment Question C, pp. 6-15), the Draft 
Review states: 
The estimated sea-level rise in San Francisco under three future greenhouse 
gas emission scenarios (referred to as representative concentration pathways 
[RCPs]) is summarized below: 
• RCP 8.5 is consistent with a future in which there are no significant 
global efforts to limit or reduce emissions. In 2100, the likely sea-level 
rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.6 to 3.4 feet. 
11 See http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/project/regional-sea-Ievel-rise-mapping-and-shoreline-
analysis/) and http:/ /www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/wp-content/uploads/20 18/07/BA T A-ART -SLR-
Analysis-and-Mapping-Report-Final-20 170908.pdf 
12 http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda _items/20 180314/Item3 _Exhibit-
A_OPC_SLR_Guidance-rd3.pdf 
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• RCP 4.5 is a moderate emissions reduction scenario and assumes that 
global greenhouse gas emissions will be curtailed. In 2100, the likely sea-
level rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.2 to 2. 7 feet. 
• RCP 2.6 is a stringent emissions reduction scenario and assumes that 
global greenhouse gas emissions will be significantly curtailed. In 2100, 
the likely sea-level rise associated with this scenario ranges from 1.0 to 
2.4 feet. 
Based on the information above, a contingency of up to a 3-foot increase in 
sea level was considered in designing the crest elevation for Parcels E and E-
2. 
No other information has been identified to suggest that the remedies may not 
be protective of human health or the environment. (p. 6-15.) 
The assumption greenhouse gas emissions will curtail is speculative at best, 
and should not be used as a guideline in remediation planning. This is especially true 
with the current EPA's efforts to abandon stringent greenhouse gas and other 
emissions limits from coal fired power plants and other industries. 
BCDC's "Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise Analysis and 
Mapping Project" outlines a range oflikely sea level rise scenarios (see Appendix Ill, 
p. 13). The upper bound of these scenarios is 5.5 feet (66 inches) sea level rise by the 
year 2100. Adapting to Rising Tides also considers a 100-year extreme tide (see 
appendix Ill, p. 15), which is the coastal water level elevation that has a 1 percent 
chance of occurring in any given year. A 5.5 feet (66 inches) sea level rise with the 
100-year extreme tide would create a tide 9 feet (108 inches) above Mean Higher High 
Water (MHHW, the average of the high water mark of each tidal day observed over 
the National Tidal Datum Epoch). 
Even minimal risk of catastrophic events must be considered and planned for 
due to the dangerous radioactive and contamination in close proximity to people and 
the Bay. 
According to the 2018 State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance (Appendix 
II, p. 57): 
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• Sea level rise will reach 5.7 to 6.9 feet by 2100 under the medium to high 
risk aversion scenario. 
• Sea level rise will reach 10.2 feet by 2100 under the H++ scenario (detailed 
below). 
The 2018 State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance suggests that projects 
with a lifespan beyond 2050, that have a low-tolerance for risk (i.e., hazardous waste 
& toxic storage sites) should use H++ scenario. H++ scenarios can be considered the 
"worst-case" possibility and describe an extreme sea level rise scenario that would 
result from a catastrophic event (i.e., the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet), 
especially under high emission scenarios. The projected sea level rise under the H++ 
scenario is 10.2 feet by 2100. 
The projections used by the Draft Review are inadequate because they do not 
consider the most up to date sea level rise projections or consider a future in which 
emissions will increase. The State of California Sea Level Rise Guidance 2018 Update 
has estimated the chance of sea level rise meeting or exceeding various heights in 
various years (see Appendix I, p. 58). It estimates these percentages under two 
scenarios: one in a future with low carbon emissions and one in a future with high 
carbon emissions. The likeliness of sea level rise exceeding 3 feet by 21 00 under a 
future with low emissions is 7%. The likeliness of sea level rise to exceed 3 feet by 
2100 with high future emissions is 28%. So, the current design has a 7-28% chance of 
failure due to sea level rise by 2100, depending on the future carbon emissions. This 
risk is unacceptable. 
The risk of flooding and inundation is especially important for Parcel E-2, 
due to its history of disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste. According 
to Adapting to Rising Tides, Sea level rise and storm events may cause 
flooding or groundwater intrusion to contaminated sites and landfill waste 
containment systems. Temporary or permanent surface flooding, erosive tidal 
or wave energy, and elevated groundwater levels could cause the release of 
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hazardous substances with potentially significant consequences on public 
health, the environment, and the local economy. 13 
The release of any amount of toxic or radioactive substances in Hunters Point 
would be detrimental because the community is already disproportionately burdened 
by a multitude of environmental hazards, and would have a significant negative impact 
on the entire Bay ecosystem. 
Both BCDC and the State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance project sea 
level rise to surpass the 3-foot mark accounted for in the Navy's design 
considerations. Three feet above mean sea level is generally considered in the middle 
ofthe likely range of sea level rise by 2100. When planning for construction in an area 
that is as dangerous when flooded as Parcels E and E2 with all the toxic waste they 
contain, the upper bound of all sea level rise scenarios should be used, which 
according to BCDC is 9 feet and according to State of California Sea-Level Rise 
Guidance is 10.2 feet. 
Accordingly, the remedies that could be affected by sea-level rise significantly 
higher than the unreasonably low assumptions made by the Navy must be 
reconsidered in this review. 
A. Potential Flooding of the Revetment Wall Must Be Considered 
As depicted in the Engineering/Remediation Resources Group, Inc.'s Shoreline 
Revetment Detail the highest point of the design is the concrete sea wall, standing at 
approximately 7 feet above mean sea level. This height is insufficient in light of 
current updated scientific sea level rise projections referenced above. Combined with 
the possibility of high tides, king tides, storm surges, wind driven waves and El Nino, 
all of the sea level rise possibilities outlined in the previous section indicate there is a 
strong likelihood of the currently designed sea wall flooding. 
13 SF BCDC Adapting to Rising Tides. "Contaminated Lands", p. 1. 
http://www.adaptingtorisingtides.org/portfolio/contaminated-lands/ 
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Remedial design should reflect the possibility which would most effectively protect 
the residents of Bayview Hunters Point. Considering the catastrophic health hazards 
which could result from Parcel E-2 flooding, the H++ scenario should be used, 
accounting for sea level rise of 10.2 feet by 2100. In conclusion, the construction of a 
revetment sea wall at 7 foot is inadequate, and will likely expose additional 
contaminants to a community and San Francisco Bay that are already overburdened 
with multiple environmental hazards. 
B. Concerns about Slurry Wall Construction 
The Draft Review does not address the effect of sea level rise on slurry walls. 
As sea levels rise, the levels of ground water tables rise as well. Nor does it account 
for how the rise of groundwater will affect the integrity of the slurry walls. The design 
process seems to be using current groundwater levels, but not planning for new 
levels/flow directions/pressures. The effective life cycle of these slurry walls is not 
addressed, and if it is more than 1 0-15 years, which it well should be, these sea level 
rise outcomes should be a major design consideration. This also of course impacts the 
"remedy" of leaving contamination buried at the waterfront. 
Constructing a slurry wall on fractured bedrock is a poorly engineered idea 
which fails to provide a long term solution. While the review indicates that the land is 
not an aquifer due to its limited flow capability, ineffectiveness remains. Regardless of 
the depth of the slurry wall, water will percolate through the cracks of the bedrock on 
which the slurry wall sits. This will enable the interaction of the contaminated landfill 
groundwater with both the San Francisco Bay water and surrounding uncontaminated 
groundwater. 
The Draft Review additionally fails to address any seismic activity that may 
occur, which could both destroy the slurry wall and potentially further fracture the 
bedrock. This should be a major concern as San Francisco is right on the San Andreas 
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Fault and, is highly susceptible to major, potentially catastrophic earthquakes like the 
one on April18, 1906. 
The Navy's reliance on below-ground barriers and capping of contaminated 
soil with a few feet of barriers are not safe or sustainable remedies for the extremely 
contaminated land ofParcel-E and E 2. In particular, caps are extremely vulnerable to 
flooding with increased water levels caused by sea level rise. 
C. The Slurry Wall Will Not Stop Rising Groundwater Inundation 
of Contamination 
Increased water levels in the Bay and storm surges are not the only flooding 
and inundation threat to the "remedy" of leaving buried contaminated waste so close 
to the Bay. As sea levels rise, so will groundwater. 
A study by the US Geological Survey and Yale University states " ... as sea 
level rises, so will groundwater levels, and since underground infrastructure -
including sewer pipes and utility equipment- was built with historical groundwater 
levels in mind, this could lead to expensive headaches for coastal communities." 14 
A slurry wall and capping on top of contamination will do nothing to prevent 
rising groundwater from inundating and potentially flooding the area, resulting in an 
environmental and health disaster. 
D. The Vulnerability of Bayview Hunters Point Residents to 
Pollution Must Be Factored Into the Review 
The Navy's remediation of the Shipyard Superfund Site must continue to be 
protective of health and the environment. It must be based on science and take into 
account the current reality of the health crisis and environmental conditions at and 
14 http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/sea-level-rise-may-raise-groundwater-levels 
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near the site, including Bayview Hunters Point, and how potential failure of remedies 
at the shipyard could significantly exacerbate them. 
Unfortunately, the approved remedies do not take into consideration the well-
documented health vulnerabilities of residents. Remedies must be based on facts, not 
on abstract "health" levels that are not appropriate for Bayview Hunters Point. 
It is a well-established fact that Bayview Hunters Point is heavily impacted by 
decades of pollution from industry and the military, as well as from two freeways, the 
City's main sewage treatment plant, dozens of contamination sites, freight transport, 
the Port of San Francisco, and under-regulated and unregulated businesses operating 
with little or no government oversight. 
In January 2017, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 
(OEHHA), on behalf of the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEP A), 
released Version 3.0 ofthe California Communities Environmental Health Screening 
Tool (CalEnviroScreen). CalEnviroScreen identifies California communities by 
census tract that are disproportionately burdened by, and vulnerable to, multiple 
sources of pollution. CalEnviroScreen measures vulnerability through evaluating and 
quantifying pollution exposures, environmental effects, sensitive populations and 
socioeconomic factors. 
CalEnviroScreen 3.0 found that BVHP is one ofthe communities in the entire 
state most at risk from pollution, and concluded that it has a higher pollution burden 
than 90% of the state. 
CalEnviroScreen 3.0, quantifies this community's significant exposure to 
environmental hazards, ranking it in the 99th percentile for diesel Particulate Matter, 
98th percentile for groundwater threats, and 86th percentile for hazardous waste. It 
found BVHP to be in the 98th percentile for asthma. 
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Based on the facts regarding these significant and alarming vulnerabilities, the 
remedies set forth in the various RODs must be re-evaluated and new, more protective 
remedies adopted. The appropriate health protective remedies will require an 
expanded, comprehensive and safe cleanup and removal of as much of the hazardous 
and radioactive waste as possible from the site - not merely capping waste in place. 
Leaving radioactive and hazardous wastes buried at the Superfund Site, next to 
existing and proposed neighborhoods, under what is proposed to be recreational "open 
space," and next to the San Francisco Bay waterfront threatened by rising sea levels-
projected to be as more than 5 feet by 2100 under "moderate" assumptions and 
climbing even higher in future centuries - is purely reckless and unacceptable. 
E. The Entire Shipyard Superfund Site and Adjacent Areas Must 
Be Comprehensively Retested, With Independent Community 
Oversight 
The Navy must carry through with its public commitment to properly retest all 
areas, not just some areas, where Tetra Tech did radiological work at the Shipyard. 
The Navy and other government agencies must test the entire Shipyard Site and 
adjacent areas, including any locations that information provided by whistleblowers, 
residents and other reliable sources indicate may have been contaminated from 
Shipyard operations. 
Scanning is insufficient and unacceptable if not combined with comprehensive 
core sampling. Testing must be thorough and comprehensive: 
a. Radiological core sampling must be conducted of the entire site and 
adjacent areas. It is imperative that all core samples go at least 9 feet beneath 
the surface, . 
b. The core sampling should create a 2m x 2m mapping grid, 
c. All core sampling must follow split sampling protocols. 
d. All ground water should be tested for radiation contamination, including 
aquifers A and B, 
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e. The Navy must immediately begin working with the State of California 
and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District to develop and implement 
standards for fugitive radiological dust, and 
f. Radiologically contaminated soil should be marked with an orange colored 
dye. Applying this would explicitly identify important areas, help prevent 
accidental shipments of radioactive soil to landfills, and act as a dust 
suppression measure. 
F. Land Use 
Simply stated. kids and other residents should not live, work or play next to or 
on top of hazardous and radioactive waste. The effect of a botched and inadequate 
cleanup reverberate far beyond the shipyard, impacting nearby San Francisco 
neighborhoods, the Bay itself and all who enjoy it and rely upon it, including 
subsistence fishers, and communities along the Bay. 
We call on the Navy and regulatory agencies to reconsider the RODs, as part 
of this five-year review, to incorporate newer and more protective cleanup standards 
and a comprehensive remediation. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The widespread fraud and botched cleanup, the lack of proper regulatory 
oversight, the lack of transparency and the government's inappropriate relationship 
with mega-developer Lennar/Five Points have undermined a proper cleanup of the 
contamination and resulted in the reckless and unscientific "remedies" being evaluated 
in the Draft Review. This is the time and process to re-evaluate the "remedies" because 
they: 
• are not protective of public health or the environment, 
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• do not take into account the fact that Bayview Hunters Point residents have 
been found by the State of California to be highly at risk and vulnerable to 
pollution due to health, environmental and socio-economic indicators, 
• endanger San Francisco Bay, 
• are based in significant part on "data" produced by Tetra Tech despite the 
widespread fraud committed by that company during years of "remediation" 
work at the Superfund site, 
• are not based on the pending large scale retesting of much of the Superfund 
Site which has not yet begun, and 
• do not reflect latest scientific consensus on expected sea level rise due to 
climate change. 
Our comments highlight serious flaws and omissions in the Navy's review that 
must be corrected. These flaws include, among others, inadequate consideration of the 
impact ofthe radiological fraud on the cleanup and outdated assumptions which will 
particularly impact the large amounts of hazardous and radioactive waste buried at 
Parcel E-2; the Draft Review's remedy analysis fails to adequately address rising sea 
levels due to climate change which threaten San Francisco Bay and its waterfront. The 
threat that rising Bay levels could inundate portions of the shipyard including Parcel 
E-2, as well as an inadequate revetment design that will not provide adequate 
protection from contaminants reaching the Bay are real and must be addressed. 
The ROD remedies that are subject to the five-year review must be revised as 
part of this review process to incorporate the entirely foreseeable effects of significant 
new information, not available when the RODs were adopted. This includes the 
impact of the radiological fraud and the substantial and growing threat that Bay-level 
rise presents to the future integrity of remedies selected years ago. 
We have already seen the consequences of the Navy's failure to anticipate 
foreseeable risks. In August 2000, local residents observed strange-colored smoke 
from what appeared to be a fire burning underground in Parcel E-2. This subsurface 
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fire burned for months, with plumes of smoke readily visible to affected residents, 
some of whom report adverse respiratory affects. The smoke also affected shipyard 
workers and the police personnel based there. The Navy failed to properly inform the 
public about the health risks for the better part of three weeks after the fire broke out. 15 
That an underground chemical fire erupted and burned for months in a supposedly 
stable capped "remedy" highlights the risks to protectiveness from leaving highly 
toxic waste buried on site. 
The Navy must plan for- not underplay- predictable risks such as those posed 
by global warming, especially at Parcel E-2, where buried contamination is extensive 
and will continue to be toxic far into the future. If the Navy gets it wrong as a result of 
its refusal to factor up-to-date science into the five-year review, it could unleash a 
catastrophe to the public health and the environment. As more and more data on sea-
level and Bay-level rise emerges, the Navy must reconsider and conclude that the 
buried hazardous and radioactive waste at Parcel E 2 needs to be removed from 
proximity to residents and the rising Bay. 
The Draft Five-Year Review needs to be redone to incorporate up-to-date 
science and public health data. Common sense and environmental justice require that 
remedies be revisited as part of the five-year review and revised remedies must 
prioritize removal of any and all hazardous and radioactive waste and contamination 
from the site. 





Appendix I. Probability that Sea-Level Rise will meet or exceed a particular 
height (in feet) in San Francisco (State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance 
2018 Update, p. 58) 
The chart below displays the chances sea level rise will meet or exceed a certain 
height by the year listed. 
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Appendix II. Projected Sea-Level Rise (in feet) for San Francisco (State of 
California Sea-Level Rise Guidance, p. 57) 
The chart below portrays the probabilistic projections for sea-level rise height, along 
with the H++ scenario (shown in the far right, blue column), as seen in the Rising Seas 
Report. 
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Appendix Ill. San Francisco Sea Level Rise Scenarios (Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission's Adapting to Rising Tides Bay Area Sea Level Rise 
Analysis and Mapping Project, Final Report 2017, Pages 13-15) 
The firs t six scenarios (12 , 24 , 36 , 48, 52, and 66 inches of SLR above MHHW) relate directly to the NRC 
SLR estimates, and they capture a broad range of scenarios between the most-likely scenario and the 
high end of the uncertainty range at both mid-century and the end of the century: 
1. 12-inch SLR::; 2050 most-likely SLR scenario 
2. 24-inch SLR = 2050 high end of the range; or an existing 5-year extreme tide 
3. 36-inch SLR = 2100 most-likely SLR scenario ; or an existing 50-year extreme tide 
4. 48-inch SLR ::::: 2100 upper 85 percent confidence in terval ; or 6 inches of SLR plus a 100-year 
extreme tide 
5. 52-inch SLR ::; 12-inch SLR plus 1 00-year extreme tide 
6. 66-inch SLR = 2100 upper-end SLR scenario; or 24 -inch SLR plus 100-year extreme tide 
Inundation maps were also created for Bay water level elevations of 77, 84 , 96, and 108 inches above 
MHHW . These levels are above curren t predictions fo r SLR likely to occur by 2100, bu t they are helpful in 
illustrating short-term flood ing that cou ld occur when extreme tides are coupled with SLR: 
7. 77 inches above MHHW::::: 36-inch SLR plus 1 00-year extreme tide 
8. 84 inches above MHHW::: 48- inch SLR plus 50-year extreme tide 
9. 96 inches above MHHW ::::: 66- inch SLR plus 25-year extreme tide 
10. 108 inches above MHHW ::::: 66-inch SLR plus 1 00-year extreme tide 
Daily Tide Extreme Tide (Storm Surge) 

























































The Honorable James Donato 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Federal Building and Courthouse 
450 Golden Gate A venue 
San Francisco, California 
Dear Judge Donato: 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE 
33000 NIXIE WAY, BLDG 50 STE 207 
SAN DIEGO, CA 92147 
5820 
Ser BPM0/003 
March 15, 2018 
SUBJECT: VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT IN THE MATTER OF U.S. V. HUBBARD 
The Department of the Navy has been designated a crime victim under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 as 
a result of the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard, a former employee of Tetra Tech EC Inc. (Tt 
EC), and others. The Navy contracted Tt EC to prepare planning documents, investigate 
radiological contamination, conduct remediation, dispose of radioactive waste, and document 
their activities to support closure of radiologically-impacted sites and buildings at Hunters Point 
. Naval Shipyard (HPNS) from 2003 to 2014. These activities were necessary prior to the Navy 
turning HPNS over to the City of San Francisco for redevelopment. The fraud committed by Mr. 
Hubbard and other Tt EC employees has caused not only a substantial financial loss to the Navy, 
but harm to the Navy's reputation, and it has cost the Navy substantial resources and time. The 
purpose of this statement is to give the Court a sense of the magnitude of the negative impact of 
this fraudulent conduct and how it has made the accomplishment ofboth the Navy's and the 
City's goals more difficult. Because of the widespread and continuing harm that he has caused 
the Navy, we ask that you award Mr. Hubbard a substantial sentence. 
While the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has caused the Navy concrete and 
measurable monetary loss (addressed below), this fi:aud has also caused significant harm to the 
Navy that is much more difficult to quantify - but very real. The fraud and uncertainty 
surrounding Tt EC's work at HPNS has caused a complete loss of trust in the Navy by the local 
community. The new residents at HPNS are understandably anxious for their safety, and this has 
required additional effort by the Navy and regulators to address these concerns. The transfer of 
the property to the City will be delayed by many years, and the Navy has had to address the ire 
and frustration of the Mayor's Office, the Supervisor's Office, and local Congressional staffs. 
The redevelopment ofHPNS was supposed to revitalize the community and provide jobs and 
affordable housing; all of that is now on hold indefinitely as the Navy and the regulatory 
agencies have determined that Tt EC's work is unreliable. The frustrations of these local 
constituencies have been channeled into a stmng activist element which has made the Navy's 
public meetings tense, aggressive and explosive. 
5820 
Ser BPM0/003 
March 15, 2018 
The fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has also led to negative national media 
attention. The effort to respond to this negative media attention has required increased staffing 
to answer questions, prepare for interviews, and conduct risk communication training - all of 
which pulled Navy staffaway from their primary duties and caused collateral impacts to other 
Navy bases and projects. 
In addition to responding to the media, correcting misinformation, and responding to the 
concerns of the public and politicians, the Navy's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Office 
created a special Review Team to assess the fraud allegations; determine what level of additional 
site investigation was needed, perform sampling, and then incorporate these findings into a new 
Work Plan for HPNS. These activities diverted significant numbers of BRAC employees from 
their nc;nmal duties, causing additional disruption to numerous other Navy projects across the 
country. This diversion of personnel and resources resulted in delays and increased costs for 
these other projects and resulted in constant stress on the Navy staff over a sustained period of 
time. The efforts of the Review Team and other similar efforts (including legal and contract 
dispute efforts, technical re-calculations, political briefings to the City and Congressional 
delegations, and constant con.:nnullication up and down the Navy chain of Commartd); has cost 
Navy personnel hundreds if not thousands of hours of additional work. The Navy estimates that 
the fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has set back the planned transfer ofHPNS 
property to the City by an approximate decade. This means not only lost development 
opportunities for the City and the local community, but continued cost to the Navy to hold and 
maintain the property. 
The fraud has also caused a loss of confidence by the regulatory community (both EPA and. 
California State regulators) regarding the Navy's radiological remediation program and the 
Navy's competence to implement it. The EPA has expressed to the Navy that they no longer 
have confidence in the work perfmmed by Tt EC at HPNS; as well as at other Navy radiological 
sites including those located at Treasure Island and Alameda in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
The Navy now faces an uphill struggle to rehabilitate itself from this negative connotation in the 
regulatory community. It will take years to rebuild this credibility. · 
As I indicated above, the negative fiscal impact to the Navy of the fraud committed by Mr. 
Hubbard and others at HPNS is consequential, and continues to be assessed. The Navy awarded 
sixteen contract task orders to address radiological work at HPNS to Tt EC. To date, the Navy 
has paid TtEC $261.8M for work performed at HPNS. Due to the uncovered fraud, all of this 
work has been called into question and may need to be re-performed. After discovering evidence 
of Tt EC data falsification/manipulation, and becoming aware of allegations from former. Tt EC 
employees/subcontractors, the Navy hired an independent contractor (Battelle) to provide daily 
onsite radiological quality assurance for all Navy contractors performing radiological work at 
HPNS. This cost approximately $2.2M. The Navy also hired CH2MHill to re-evaluate the work 





database for buildings and soil sites for falsification/manipulation using a variety of statistical 
and logic tests. This analysis provided evidence of previously-undiscovered data falsification 
and manipulation, which prompted the Navy to begin preparing work plans for an independent 
analysis of the worksite. The total cost for the database evaluation, work plan preparation, and 
preliminary field work is approximately $8.8M. The Navy is currently working with federal and 
state regulatory agencies to determine the extent of rework that will be necessary at HPNS in 
order for the Navy to obtain the required "free release" from the regulatory agencies to turn the 
property over to the City. The EPA has indicated that it would require all work to be re-
performed as originally contracted. However, these discussions are not final. The Navy's best 
estimates for required re-work costs currently range from $1OOM to $3OOM. 
In sum, the Navy has expended $272.8 M to date paying Tt EC for their work at HPNS, 
identifying the fraud, and taking measures to prevent further fraud. Depending on the cost of 
required re-work, this number will certainly rise to $372.8 M and is likely to rise as high as 
$572.8 M. This amount of money would buy a new Littoral Combat ship. It is nearly half of the 
Navy's total expenditures for all environmental clean-up activities at HPNS through fiscal year 
2017 ($991.1 M). This is money that could otherwise have been used by the Navy to u:ain 
sailors, build ships, purchase aircraft, -in short, to perform the Navy's core mission of fighting 
the country's wars, deterring aggression; and maintaining the .freedom of the seas. 
The fraud committed by Mr. Hubbard and others has undermined the taxpayer's trust in the 
.Navy as a good financial steward. Taxpayers trust that the Navy only asks for what it needs, 
knowing that there are many other important and vital uses for limited funds. The Navy invests 
an enormous amount of time, energy, and pride in building this trust, and because of that, the 
military is generally considered one of the most trusted institutions in America. But it only takes 
the misconduct of a few individuals to erode that essential tlust- misconduct like Mr. Hubbard's. 
Mr. Hubbard's actions had far-reaching consequences for the United States, its employees, 
the City of San Francisco, the local residents, and the taxpayers. The Navy therefore respectfully 
requests that the Court consider a severe sentence for Mr. Hubbard that is commensurate with the 





















DECLARATION OF STEVEN J. CASTLEMAN 
 
1. My name is Steven J. Castleman. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
California. Together with my co-counsel, David Anton, I represent Greenaction for 
Health and Environmental Justice in this action and a Petition seeking to revoke the 
federal Materials License of Tetra Tech, EC, Inc. (“Tetra Tech”), License number 29-
31396-01, issued by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”). The Petition is pending 
before the Executive Director for Operations of the NRC. That Petition (Exhibit 1 to this 
action), supported by statements under penalty of perjury, demonstrates Tetra Tech 
engaged in widespread fraud, including reporting fraudulent sampling and scanning data, 
which has compromised the remediation of radioactive contamination at the Hunters 
Point Naval Shipyard in San Francisco, California (“Shipyard”).  
2. The U.S. Navy hired contractors to review the data reported by Tetra Tech in an attempt 
to ascertain which, if any, of those data are reliable. One or more of those contractors 
wrote the reports entitled Draft Radiological Data Evaluation Findings Report for 
Parcels B and G Soil, dated September 2017, which is attached to the Supplemental 
Filing as Exhibit 1 and Draft Radiological Data Evaluation Findings Report for Parcels 
C and E Soil, dated December 2017, which is attached to the Supplemental Filing as 
Exhibit 1. It supplements the evidence of fraud and was not known at the time of the 
filing of the Petition.  
3. On January 12, 2018, I had a telephone conversation with Dr. Kathryn A. Higley, a 




Engineering at Oregon State University. She has been hired by the U.S. Navy to act as a 
Community Technical Liaison for the radiation cleanup at the Shipyard.   
4. During our phone conversation, Dr. Higley told me that the Navy has concluded, after 
data reviews including the one represented by Exhibit 1, that virtually all of the data 
reported by Tetra Tech is suspect. Later in our conversation she qualified what she said, 
saying a substantial but undefined proportion of Tetra Tech’s data was “to a large extent 
useless.” She also informed me that substantial re-sampling and re-scanning will be 
required to determine the full impact of Tetra Tech’s fraud on the cleanup and the 
planning process for that project is currently under way.  
5. On January 31, 2018, I attended a Community Open House meeting hosted by the Navy 
concerning the Hunters Point Shipyard radiological cleanup. Prior to the meeting I had a 
conversation with Derek Robinson, of the Navy’s Base Realignment and Closure 
Program Management Office West (“BRAC PMO West”). He is the person in charge of 
the cleanup of the shipyard on behalf of the Navy. During our conversation, Mr. 
Robinson confirmed what Dr. Higley told me; the Navy had lost confidence in the Tetra 
Tech data. Mr. Robinson also said that the Navy was going to treat all Tetra Tech’s data 
as unreliable and resample all locations where Tetra Tech did radiological work.    
6. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
 
                  June 26, 2018 
______________________________    ___________________ 
Steven J. Castleman      Date 
















Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2018 4:26 PM
To: 'Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO'
Cc: David Anton; 'Bradley Angel'; brian@greenaction.org
Subject: List of Witnesses/Meeting Request 





















From: Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO [mailto:derek.j.robinson1@navy.mil]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2018 8:06 AM 
To: Steven Castleman 
Subject: RE: Meeting Request/List of Witnesses 
 
Dear Mr. Castleman, 
 
I will not be able to meet this week, but have been discussing your request internally and should have a 
response by early next week. 
 




Derek J. Robinson, PE 
BRAC Environmental Coordinator 
Navy BRAC PMO West 
33000 Nixie Way; Bldg 50 
San Diego CA 92147 







From: Steven Castleman [mailto:scastleman@ggu.edu]  
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 11:54 AM 
To: Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO 
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Meeting Request/List of Witnesses 
 




I told you I would get you a list by last Friday of percipient witnesses that should be interviewed in the Tetra 
Tech case. Unfortunately, It that will have to be delayed until later this afternoon or tomorrow because I have 




On a different subject, are you able to meet this Thursday or Friday? If not, can we schedule a meeting that fits 










Visiting Associate Professor & Staff Attorney 
 
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic 
 
415-442-6675 | scastleman@ggu.edu <mailto:scastleman@ggu.edu>  
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WARNING: This E-mail, and any attachments, are covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. §2510-2521. This email may contain confidential and legally privileged information. The contents of 
this e-mail, and any attachments, are intended solely for the use of the person or entity to whom the e-mail was 
addressed. This email may also contain information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
work-product doctrine, or other privileges, and may be restricted from disclosure by applicable Federal and 
3
State laws. If you are not the intended recipient of this email you are advised that any dissemination, 
distribution, or use of the contents of this message is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail message in 
error, please contact the sender by reply e-mail or phone. Please also permanently delete all copies of the 




Sent: Friday, February 16, 2018 1:08 PM
To: 'Robinson, Derek J CIV NAVFAC HQ, BRAC PMO'
Cc: 'Bradley Angel'; brian@greenaction.org; David Anton; 'Fairbanks, Brianna'; 
'lee.lily@epa.gov'





























RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY REPORT 
 
   NWTS #:Par A M/H Bkg Brick 012804                                                                         Page __1_ of __1_ 
DATE: January 28, 2004 INSTRUMENTATION USED 
TIME: 0800 hours MODEL S/N EFF.% BKRD CAL. DUE DATE 
SURVEYOR: Bert Bowers 
Ludlum: 
19 
101733 N/A 5-10 
R/hr October 1, 2004 
LOCATION: 




82955 N/A 10,514 CPM August 21, 2004 




 12% 2 CPM 
October 13, 2004 
 6% 255CPM 
R dose rates = R/hr;      survey results = CPM 
 
   
PURPOSE OF SURVEY:  
Establish background reference area/levels (from non-impacted M/H location) similar to 





 #    R
 1 2 317 15996 5 
 2 4 349 15549 5 
 3 4 325 16502 7 
 4 3 419 16022 6 
 5 4 348 15858 6 
 6 2 365 15758 6 
 7 2 300 16384 6 
 8 0 378 16304 7 
 9 1 335 15635 5 
 10 2 334 18530 10 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Remarks: Composite sample collected from w/i manhole trench___________ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
______________________________________________________________ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
______________________________________________________________ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
New World Technology FORM NWT-001 
Gamma Spectroscopy Results











































Monday, March 15, 2004 Page 1 of 1
*<MDA = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA)
** = Activity for this Nuclide is less than the MDA, therefore no Uncertainty is neccesary
*NA = No DCGL available for this Nuclide
*<DCGL=Nuclide failed key line energy and shape tests and is determined not to be present in sample
#F = All energy peakes determining this isotope had bad poisson shape; this distortion signifies non-existence of the 
radionuclide
*F=Failed energy identification fraction and key energy tests demonstrating non-existence of the nuclide
Gamma Spectroscopy Results
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